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ONE

History and Theory of Anthropology
and Ethnology

Introduction

In the absence of history, men create myths.
—George W. Stocking Jr., in “Matthew Arnold,
E. B. Tylor, and the Uses of Invention” (1963)

Debates on the history of anthropology play an important part in anthropological theory. They generally revolve around questions such as: When did anthropology begin? How was its subject matter defined? What were the formative influences on its development: scholarly curiosity or colonialism? Anthropologists enjoy such debates as part of a “professional socialization that consists in good part of constructing unique, individual genealogies for disciplinary practice” (Darnell 2001:xxi). Accordingly, the history of anthropology has been written from a variety of viewpoints, depending on gender, nationality, and theoretical or political perspectives.

The data presented in this book indicate that ethnography and ethnology as important roots of sociocultural anthropology originated in the work of eighteenth-century German or German-speaking scholars associated with the Russian Academy of Sciences, the University of Göttingen, and the Imperial Library in Vienna. The formation of these studies took place in three stages: (1) as Völker-Beschreibung or ethnography in the work of the German historian and Siberia explorer Gerhard Friedrich Müller during the first half of the eighteenth century, (2) as Völkerkunde and ethnologia in the work of the German or German-speaking historians August Ludwig Schlözer, Johann Christoph Gatterer, and Adam František Kollár during the second half of the eighteenth century, and (3) as ethnography or ethnology by scholars in other centers of learning in Europe and the...
United States during the final decades of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.

While ethnography was conceived as a program for describing peoples and nations in Russian Asia and carried out by German-speaking explorers and historians, ethnology originated with historians in European academic centers dealing with a comprehensive and critical study of peoples—in principle, of all peoples and nations. Whereas the former group of scholars laid the foundations for a descriptive and comprehensive study of peoples and nations, the latter developed ethnology as a theoretical and comparative discipline (*Völkerkunde*).

**Plural Views on Anthropology and Its History**

These findings are relevant to debates on the origins of anthropology, its object, and its identity. Most sociocultural anthropologists view anthropology as a “young” discipline, originating during the second half of the nineteenth century with Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917), Henry Sumner Maine (1822–88), and John Ferguson McLennan (1827–81) in Great Britain; Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815–87) and Adolf Bastian (1826–1905) in Switzerland and Germany; and Lewis Henry Morgan (1818–81) in the United States. In their research, anthropology—at the time usually referred to as ethnology—is regarded to have become “scientific” by adopting evolutionism as a theory and kinship as the primary object of study. Ethnologists and social or cultural anthropologists share this opinion to an almost canonical degree.¹ Subsequently, Franz Boas (1858–1942) founded modern anthropology in the United States during the early twentieth century, while Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) and Marcel Mauss (1872–1950) played a similar role in France. In Great Britain Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) are seen as the fathers of social anthropology. Malinowski is often celebrated as the father of long-term fieldwork, developing the emblematic method of “participant observation” with which modern anthropology purportedly began.²

In contrast to practicing anthropologists, historians trace anthropology to ancient Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and Arabic scholars. Arguing that anthropology is an “old” discipline, they see it as commencing in antiquity with Herodotus and Strabo among the
Greeks, Ptolemy and Tacitus among the Romans. Their work on
the history and geography of the ancient world included a discus-
sion of the population, or ethnography, which is often seen as hav-
ing laid the foundation for anthropology. This view is sometimes
broadened by assuming that an interest in other people is basic to
humanity, leading to the thesis that cultural anthropology began in
prehistoric times when the “first Stone Age man” commented on
his neighbors’ customs.

Many theories have been developed as alternatives to these two
basic views. Some argue that anthropology arose during the Renais-
sance and the Age of Discovery (1450–1700), when Europeans explored
the world. Such journeys mainly served to expand trade but seafar-
ers encountered “exotic” human beings beyond Europe and wrote
valuable ethnographic reports. Others point to overland travelers like
Carpini, Rubruck, and Marco Polo. During the Middle Ages mer-
chants and missionaries, dispatched to establish relations with the
Mongol rulers of China, often penned detailed reports. Still oth-
ers see anthropology as a “romantic” discipline, originating from
encounters between European travelers, missionaries, and colonial
officers and the peoples outside Europe. This view links a defini-
tion of anthropology as the study of the “Other” to Romanticism, a
philosophical movement of the late eighteenth and the early nine-
teenth centuries that added a sentimental countercurrent to West-
ern rationalism.

Historians of Native Americans claim that comparative ethnology
began with the French Jesuit Joseph-François Lafitau in 1724. He in
turn built on José de Acosta’s work, dated 1590 (Pagden 1986). Oth-
ers argue that relativism in anthropology originated with Michel de
Montaigne, Fernández de Oviedo, Bartolomé de las Casas, and Ber-
nardino de Sahagún during the sixteenth century, both in Europe
and in the Americas (Erdheim 1990).

Social anthropologists in Britain and France developed their own
perspectives, seeing anthropology as a product of the Enlighten-
ment. Durkheim (1892) counted Montesquieu among his scholarly
forebears; Claude Lévi-Strauss (1962, 1963) adopted Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. Radcliffe-Brown (1951, 1957) and Edward Evans-Pritchard
(1951, 1962, 1981) acknowledged the moral philosophers of the Scot-
tish Enlightenment as their intellectual precursors. Adam Fergu-
son, John Millar, Lord Kames (Henry Home), Lord Monboddo (James Burnett), William Falconer, and William Robertson utilized ethnographic data to illustrate the presumed development of human society.7

Finally, there are those who recognize anthropology only when it was professionalized. Anthropology began when “the first anthropological (then called ethnological) society was formed” in Paris in 1839 (Tax 1955b:316). This narrative falls in with the viewpoint that anthropology was established as a discipline during the nineteenth century in specialized societies, ethnographic museums, and anthropological departments. The first ethnological societies were founded in France, the United States, and Great Britain between 1839 and 1843; the first specialized ethnographic museums were established in St. Petersburg (Russia), Leiden (the Netherlands), and Copenhagen (Denmark) in 1836–41 (see table 12); the first ethnographic chairs were established in Russia and the Netherlands during the 1830s (see epilogue); and the first anthropological departments emerged in the United States during the 1890s. American historians of anthropology consider professional anthropology to have commenced with Franz Boas and his students in the early twentieth century (Stocking 1974).

My view is that ethnology as one of sociocultural anthropology’s roots is neither young nor old but a mature discipline emerging during the German Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Russia, northern Asia, and central Germany. This view supplements Regna Darnell’s summary that the “role of the eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers, or the French rationalists of the same period is already well known to the history of social science. These men laid the foundations not only of anthropology as a discipline, but also of other fields of inquiry” (Darnell 1974b:5).

Varieties of Anthropology

Thus the origins of anthropology are highly diverse. Evolutionism, Romanticism, the Enlightenment, the Renaissance, the Age of Discovery, and classical antiquity have all been proposed as starting points. These views clearly depend on the theoretical perspectives of the respective authors and their answers to the question: What is anthropology about?

In the world at large, anthropology is especially known in three
forms: as philosophical anthropology, as physical or biological anthropology, and as cultural or social anthropology. Philosophical anthropology came into being during the eighteenth century with Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottfried Herder. John Zammito (2002) argues that Kant and Herder stood at the cradle of anthropology, which “was born out of philosophy” in Herder’s reformulation of Kant’s precritical work of the 1760s and early 1770s. Michael Forster (2010) emphasizes Herder’s pivotal role in the emergence of the philosophy of language, “founding such whole new disciplines concerned with language as anthropology and linguistics.”

Biological anthropologists claim that a physical study of the human species developed after 1735 with Carolus Linnaeus, Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Petrus Camper, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, John Hunter, Samuel Thomas Soemmerring, Georg Forster, Charles White, Georges Cuvier, James Cowles Prichard, William Lawrence, and others (see chapter 7).

Cultural anthropologists emphasize the predominance of culture and of evolutionism and thus give priority to the nineteenth century. Social anthropologists focus on the study of society, a concept surfacing during the eighteenth century. Students of folklore, usually regarded as a separate discipline, emphasize the study of manners and customs beginning in sixteenth-century Europe. Social and cultural anthropology are generally seen as ethnology’s successor, but even in this field one finds considerable debate on its origins. Clifford Geertz summarized the dilemma in the *Times Literary Supplement* by stating that the problem of defining anthropology’s subject matter “has been around since the beginning of the field, whenever that was (Rivers? Tylor? Herder? Herodotus?)” (Geertz 1985:623). This lineup ranges from the twentieth to the nineteenth and the eighteenth centuries back to antiquity.

Yet the majority of sociocultural anthropologists trace the origins of their discipline to the 1860s, when their “ancestors” embraced evolutionism as a theory and kinship as a method. For them Bachofen’s *Mutterrecht* (1861), Maine’s *Ancient Law* (1861), McLennan’s *Primitive Marriage* (1865), Tylor’s *Primitive Culture* (1871), and Morgan’s *Ancient Society* (1877) are the founding texts of sociocultural anthropology as a specialized discourse on human diversity.

Most practicing anthropologists do not see it as a problem that...
none of these founding fathers presented their work as a contribution to anthropology. In the era of these ancestors, anthropology was predominantly seen as a biological study of humans conducted by medical doctors and naturalists. True, in the late eighteenth century, Kant applied the term “anthropology” to a philosophical discussion of humankind, not in terms of culture, nor of peoples, but “from a pragmatic point of view” (Kant 1798). By 1860, however, “anthropology” was primarily reserved for the biological study of human diversity. This trend had been set by the German anatomist Blumenbach, who in 1790–95 reserved the name “anthropology” for a study previously referred to as the “natural history of man” (see chapter 7).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, physical anthropology rose to dominance with the founding of anthropological societies in Europe and the United States. Adopting Blumenbach’s terminology, the French physician Paul Broca created the Société d’Anthropologie de Paris in 1859. He was followed by the British physician James Hunt, who founded the Anthropological Society of London (ASL) in 1863. These societies appeared alongside the ethnological societies that had been established in Paris, New York, and London two decades earlier. As the result of discussions about the origins and definition of the terms “anthropology” and “ethnology,” a holistic model was invented during the 1860s and 1870s in which “anthropology” was seen as the general term for a field of sciences including ethnology.¹⁰

**Anthropology and Ethnology**

The founding of anthropological societies sparked a debate in England, France, and the United States about the unity of the human species and the name of the societies dealing with this subject. Following French initiatives, the Ethnological Society of London (ESL) had been founded in 1843. The ASL split off from this organization in 1863. One year later, John Lubbock, president of the ESL and future author of *Pre-Historic Times* (1865) and *The Origin of Civilisation* (1870), argued that ethnology was “an older word and a prettier word than anthropology” (Stocking 1971:381).¹¹ Therefore, it was to be preferred in the title of Section E of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), which covered “Geography and Ethnology.” With this argument Lubbock prevented an
attempt by asl members to incorporate anthropology in this section. Lubbock did not favor anthropology because the asl’s founder was a polygenesist who emphasized a biological rather than a cultural history of humankind. Following the publication of Charles Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species* (1859) and the debate on evolution during the baas meeting at Oxford in 1860, this became an important issue.

The battle between the “anthropologicals” and the “ethnologicals” ignited a heated discussion about the name under which a common institute should operate. Lubbock’s remark inspired members of the asl, especially Thomas Bendyshe (1865a, 1865b, 1865c) and James Hunt, “to trace the origin and different meanings attached to the words anthropology, ethnography and ethnology” (Hunt 1865:xcii). Both favored the term “anthropology,” which they found to be much older, having been introduced by Magnus Hundt in Leipzig as early as 1501 (see chapter 7). An agreement was reached in 1871, when the esl and asl merged into the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland (Cunningham 1908; Stocking 1971).

These events formed the background to the debate about the differences between anthropology and ethnology in England. Reflections on the conceptual history of anthropology and ethnology induced participants to change the name of a research institute. These debates also took place in France and the United States, mutually influencing each other.

In France the Société d’Ethnographie was founded in 1859, five days before the founding of the Société d’Anthropologie de Paris. The ethnographic society held its position alongside the anthropological society only with great difficulty (Lacombe 1980; Stocking 1984b). Broca was interested in “the scientific study of the human races.” Despite defining “general anthropology” as “the biology of the human species,” Broca’s anthropological program was holistic. Apart from three periodicals Broca set up a museum, the Laboratoire d’Anthropologie in 1867, and an anthropological school (École d’Anthropologie de Paris) in 1876. The laboratory and the school provided lectures in six or more fields: anatomical (or general) anthropology, biological anthropology, archaeology, demography, ethnology (defined as a “study of . . . races”), and linguistic anthropology (Blanckaert 2009; Conklin 2013). Nevertheless, Broca sub-
sumed the cultural study of man within the physical study of man (to paraphrase Stocking 1968:21).

Twenty years later, American scholars developed a holistic model in which “anthropology” was chosen as the general designation for both ethnological and physical anthropological approaches. Anthropology, in the American view, consists of four subdisciplines: (1) physical or biological anthropology, (2) ethnology or cultural anthropology, (3) archaeology, and (4) linguistic anthropology. The four-field model was first formulated in the Anthropological Society of Washington’s statutes of 1879, including “Archaeology, Somatology, Ethnology and Philology” (de Laguna 1960:94; Eidson 2000). Despite discussions about its history and status, the four-field approach is still accepted today. Boas encouraged the four-field model in the United States (Stocking 1974), having become familiar with three of them—anthropology, ethnology, and archaeology—while working in Berlin.

This holistic model was not universally accepted. Until World War II developments in many parts of Europe were rather different: anthropology and ethnology developed in separate domains, as parallels. The practitioners of these sciences primarily came from separate fields: in the case of anthropology, from biology (natural history) or medical studies; in the case of ethnology, from jurisprudence and the humanities, including history, geography, and linguistics. For a long time the term “anthropology” did not require an adjective to specify the kind of study one was referring to. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, anthropology was a medical, biological, or philosophical study of humankind. Social and cultural anthropology did not yet exist, being the product of later developments in the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively. These studies were introduced in the early twentieth century to replace a previously existing discipline: ethnology (Lowie 1953).

Remarkably, the definition of ethnology presented in the ethnological societies and in Broca’s school differed from that found in contemporary German works. While the German sources defined ethnology as the study of peoples (Völkerkunde), the ethnological societies defined ethnology as the study of human races. The Société ethnologique de Paris was founded in 1839 to study “human races according to the historical tradition, the languages and the physi-
The society’s aim, in the words of its founder, William Edwards, was to establish “what are, in effect, the various human races.”

This definition was by and large adopted in Britain. In 1848 the physiologist William Carpenter, one of the ESL’s members, called ethnology “the science of races” (Carpenter 1848; see also Burke 1848; Hunt 1865; Stocking 1973:ix–x). A decade earlier, physician James Cowles Prichard, often regarded as the founder of ethnology in Britain, defined ethnography as “a survey of the different races of men, an investigation of the physical history . . . of every tribe of the human family” (Prichard 1836–47, vol. 1:110). When the surgeon Richard King delivered his first anniversary address to the Ethnological Society of London in 1844, he defined ethnology as “the natural history of man” (King 1850[1844]:9). Following Edwards’s example, the phrenologist Luke Burke (1848) defined ethnology as “the science of human races,” while the Scottish Congregational minister John Kennedy (1851) called ethnography the “natural history of man”—the reverse of the position of Blumenbach, who had equated the “natural history of man” with anthropology.

This shift from a nation-oriented to a race-oriented ethnology has been noticed, but its epistemic character has not been understood because the history of eighteenth-century ethnology, and its connection to nineteenth-century ethnology, has not been studied in any detail. As a result, it has not been fully grasped that the definition of ethnology provided by the French and British ethnological societies of the early nineteenth century departed from that found in the eighteenth-century German works in which the subject was first articulated.

Not only physicians like Edwards and Prichard but also the British historian Thomas Arnold (1842) tended to utilize the plural “races” as another term for “peoples.” This tendency was also expressed in their equating a physical study of humankind with ethnology, rather than with anthropology, as was common in the German-speaking world. The practice to confound races and peoples occurred earlier in the work of the naturalist Buffon (see chapter 7).

German scholars distinguished anthropology as the study of human beings from ethnology as the study of peoples. As George W. Stocking Jr. noted on Boas’s work of the 1880s, “In the German usage of...
this period, ‘anthropology’ referred only to the physical study of man; what we would now call ‘cultural anthropology’ was ‘ethnology’” (Stocking 1968:335).

Some members of the ASL seem to have been aware of these differences. While the French assumed the term *ethnologie* to have been invented by the founders of the Société ethnologique de Paris and *ethnographie* by the geographer Adriano Balbi in his *Atlas ethnographique du globe* (1826), British research indicated that “ethnography seems to be first used” by historian Barthold Niebuhr, who lectured on the subject in Berlin in 1810, and by lexicographer J. H. Campe, who included the term in his 1807–11 dictionary under its German equivalent, *Volksbeschreibung* (Hunt 1865:xcii–xcv; Bendyshe 1865c). The earliest use of “ethnography” in England was found in Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman’s *Lectures on the Connexion between Science and Revealed Religion* (delivered in 1835; published in 1836). Wise- man defined ethnography as “the classification of nations from the comparative study of languages” (Hunt 1865:xcv).

These references were adopted by anthropologists like Broca (1866) and Paul Topinard (1876, 1880, 1885, 1888, 1891) in France and Théo- phil Gollier (1905) in Belgium. The new consensus was: *ethnographie* had been coined by German scholars, *ethnologie* by French savants. This myth was still recanted a century later by the Belgian anthropologist André Leguebe (1982:349).

None of these views took into account that ethnography and ethnology had commenced during the eighteenth century. In this era the foundations were laid for an “ethnical anthropology,” to borrow a term from Juul Dieserud (1908:17). As the present study demonstrates, ethnography and ethnology arose during the Enlightenment when German–speaking historians conceptualized and practiced a study of peoples called *Völker-Beschreibung* and *Völkerkunde* in German, or *ethnographia* and *ethnologia* in neo-Greek, between the 1730s and 1780s. Because ethnology was the name of the discipline now known as social or cultural anthropology, it is important to recon- struct its early history.

**Early Studies on the History of Ethnology**

The French anthropologist Paul Topinard (1888, 1891) was the first to point out that *ethnologie* had not been invented by the founders of
the Société ethnologique de Paris but fifty-two years earlier—with a different meaning. The Swiss theologian and educator Alexandre-César Chavannes used the term in his *Essai sur l’éducation intellectuelle avec le Projet d’une science nouvelle* (1787) and a book titled *Anthropologie ou science générale de l’homme* (1788). Following a partial reprint of Chavannes’s essay on education, with an introduction by the Russian émigré in France, Alexander Herzen (1886), Topinard noted that Chavannes defined *ethnologie* as “the history of peoples progressing towards civilization.”19 Chavannes regarded it as part of a larger field of study, anthropology, which he called *une science nouvelle* (the “new science” of his 1787 essay) or a “general science of man” (*science générale de l’homme*). Many scholars took up this reference, which remained the earliest-known occurrence of “ethnology” until an article written by Ján Tibenský (1978) proved otherwise.20

In 1881 Adolf Bastian, who is often viewed as the founder of ethnology in Germany, published a “Prehistory of ethnology” (*Vorgeschichte der Ethnologie*). Ethnography, he observed, had surfaced in the late eighteenth century, for instance, in an illustrated *Ethnographische Bildergallerie* (Ethnographic picture gallery), published in Nuremberg in 1791 (Bastian 1881:17–19).21 Seeing ethnology as commencing with the ethnological societies, Bastian noted that it arose later than anthropology, which originated in the sixteenth century (7). He referred to Herder’s “History of Humankind” (14) and cited from *Magazin für Ethnographie und Linguistik*, a journal published in Weimar in 1808, in which the editor, F. J. Bertuch, declared, “*Völkerkunde oder Ethnographie, guided by Anthropologie, reviews all larger and smaller branches of the . . . system of human beings*” (5, 15). (In fact, the journal’s title was *Allgemeines Archiv für Ethnographie und Linguistik*, edited by Bertuch and J. S. Vater, while the quotation derives from the introductory article written by T. F. Ehrmann.)22 Viewing ethnology as a “homeless” science, Bastian added that it required assistance from linguistics (ethnology’s “powerful ally”), psychology, archaeology, and anthropology (7). His booklet, albeit a rich piece of research, lacked precision. Its major drawback is that Bastian, by presenting the early history of ethnology as “prehistory,” suggested that the “history” of ethnology had begun with his own research, dating from 1859 on, and that of some of his contemporaries, which is highly misleading.
In his overview of “modern ethnology,” Father Wilhelm Schmidt, a supporter of separating biological and “immaterial” approaches to human diversity, reviewed a number of Bastian’s statements. Ethnology had indeed received a powerful boost from comparative linguistics during the early nineteenth century, he claimed, as linguists had made scholars aware of the fact that, apart from the anthropological grouping of races, humanity also knew other forms of belonging, namely, language families (W. Schmidt 1906:144–146). However, the first occurrence of the name *Ethnographie* remained controversial. Repeating the British findings that the term was coined at the beginning of the nineteenth century with historian Niebuhr (Bendyshe 1865c) and the lexicographer Campe (Hunt 1865:xcv), Schmidt noted that Bastian had pointed to the *Ethnographische Bildergallerie* of the late eighteenth century.23

Hans Plischke, professor of ethnology at the University of Göttingen, studied the history of ethnology in the context of sea and land voyages, utilizing a large number of travel accounts kept at the Göttingen library. Studying Göttingen’s rich ethnographic collections, which go back to the eighteenth century, Plischke (1931) pointed out that Blumenbach did not concentrate solely on physical anthropology but also studied artifacts, thus linking anthropology with ethnology. He wrote about Göttingen’s most spectacular piece, a Tungusian shaman’s coat (Plischke 1936), described Blumenbach’s influence on contemporary explorers (1937), analyzed the relations between Göttingen and Tahiti (1938b), and discussed the “Malay variety” of humankind that Blumenbach had introduced (1938a). Plischke was the first to notice that the term *Völkerkunde* had appeared in 1781 in the title of the journal *Beiträge zur Völker- und Länderkunde*, edited by Johann Reinhold Forster and Matthias Christian Sprengel (Plischke 1925:109). Even if this is not the term’s first usage, the reference preceded all others in the contemporary literature.

In 1948 Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, favoring a combination of biological, cultural, and social approaches to human diversity, published a “history of anthropology” (*Geschichte der Anthropologie*), in which he discussed both French and German anthropology and ethnology. Its second, enlarged edition (1968) is still being reprinted as a textbook. Ignoring Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, Mühlmann held the view that French scholars had preceded the Ger-
mans but that the latter had “caught up” in the late eighteenth century. He distinguished a “critical” stage (1735–78), connected with philosophers like Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau, from a “classical” stage (1775–1810), in which “leadership in anthropology passed suddenly into the hands of the Germans” (Mühlmann 1948:52, 1968:51). Scholars dominating this classical period were Blumenbach, Kant, Johann Reinhold Forster and Georg Forster, Soemmerring, Christoph Meiners, Herder, and Wilhelm von Humboldt. This view was relatively clear-cut, but Mühlmann fatally erred in stating, “Although the material and epistemological prerequisites of a disciplinary establishment of ethnology (Völkerkunde), not yet of raceology (Rassenkunde), were laid during the classical period, ethnology did not come about [in this period].” He added that ethnology could not have originated in this classical period because the interest in “exotic countries and peoples” had declined (Mühlmann 1948:71, 1968:67).

Mühlmann was misled in dating the origins of ethnology because he mistakenly believed that the terms Ethnographie and Ethnologie had been introduced in the seventeenth century. In the first edition of his history, Mühlmann stated that Johann Olorinus’s 1608 Ethnographia mundi was “the first proof of the surfacing of the term ‘ethnography.’” In its second edition Mühlmann had to correct this error: “The attribution of the word Ethnographie to the Ethnographia mundi of Olorinus (=Johann Sommer, Magdeburg 1607, 1609), that one occasionally encounters in the literature, is a misnomer: the appropriate title of the work is Ethographia mundi.” Indeed, Johann Sommer’s book was titled Ethographia mundi and was published at Magdeburg in three volumes (1608–13). In the same way Mühlmann (1968:78) had to correct Wilhelm Schmidt (1926:29), who had spelled the title of the French linguist Étienne Guichard’s Harmonie étymologique (1606) incorrectly as Harmonie ethnologique.

As a result, Mühlmann failed to observe the origins of ethnography and ethnology during the German Enlightenment. This is surprising as Mühlmann was one of the best-informed ethno-anthropologists of postwar Germany. It appears that he was familiar neither with eighteenth-century German historians doing research in Siberia nor with universal historians in Göttingen engaged in incorporating their findings into a theory of world history (see chapters 4 and 6).
American Views on the History of Ethnology

Apart from Tax’s previously mentioned article, pointing to the “anthropological (then called ethnological) societies,” only a few American studies discuss ethnology before it evolved into cultural or social anthropology. In the United States ethnology is still used as a synonym for cultural anthropology (e.g., Stocking 1968; Darnell 1974b; Voget 1975; Honigmann 1976). However, only a small number of authors have discussed the eighteenth century as the era in which ethnology first developed. One of these was Robert H. Lowie, an American ethnologist of Austrian descent. In his *History of Ethnological Theory*, Lowie (1937:5, 10–11) pointed to Christoph Meiners’s *Grundriß der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1785) as the work of an eighteenth-century historian with “a tolerably clear conception of the central core of ethnography” who had sensed “the need of a new branch of learning to be set over against political history, a science to be dubbed ‘the history of humanity.’” Lowie then discussed the nineteenth-century research of Gustav Klemm, Theodor Waitz, and Bastian, acknowledging that these scholars built upon predecessors like Meiners. The latter published numerous articles on ethnological subjects and employed the term *Völkerkunde*. More recent historians denounce his work as racist (see chapter 7).

In their review of the concept of culture, Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (1952) discussed authors writing “culture-conscious” studies during the eighteenth century. They valued Voltaire’s *Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations* (1753–56), often considered the first contribution to the philosophy of history, and argued that “two paths . . . led out from Voltaire.” The first emphasized the “spirit” (*l’esprit, Geist*) of nations and inspired Isaak Iselin, Nicolas de Condorcet, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel to reflect on human history. The second path, followed by Johann Christoph Adelung (1782), Herder (1784–91), Meiners (1785), and Daniel Jenisch (1801), focused on the “customs” (*coutumes, moeurs*) of nations, regarded as variable, plural, and empirical, rather than as rational. Thereafter, the development of the philosophy of history in Germany bifurcated to an even higher degree. The first branch became “less interested in history and more in its supreme principle. It dealt increasingly with mankind instead of peoples, it aimed at clarifying basic schemes,
and it operated with the concept of ‘spirit’ instead of that of culture.” Considering this development to be of little concern, Kroeber and Kluckhohn focused on the second “current, in which comparative, cultural, and ethnographic slants are visible from the beginning.” This branch was “interested in the actual story of what appeared to have happened to mankind. It therefore bore heavily on customs and institutions, became what we today should call culture-conscious, and finally resulted in a somewhat diffuse ethnographic interest.” The scholars involved viewed “mankind . . . as an array or series of particular peoples” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952:19, 145–146; 1963: 33, 285).

This observation is relevant for the present research. Focusing on the concept of culture, Kroeber and Kluckhohn paid little attention to the role of Völkerkunde and did not consult Bastian (1881) or Plischke (1925). However, mentioning that Meiners had employed the term Völkerkunde in 1785, they added in a footnote that this term had been found previously in Johann Reinhold Forster’s Beiträge zur Völker- und Länderkunde in 1781. They too were misguided by Mühlmann’s (1948:46) statement that the word ethnography was allegedly first used by Olorinus (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952:23 nn. 57, 58).

In 1955 the American historian of medicine Erwin Ackerknecht characterized the University of Göttingen as “the first academic center of geography in Germany” and “the first academic center of anthropology in history.” To support these claims, Ackerknecht mentioned Blumenbach’s physical anthropology, the Arabia expedition effectuated by Carsten Niebuhr (1761–67), lectures dealing with the “art of traveling” (ars apodemica), Meiners’s Grundriß der Geschichte der Menschheit (1785), and the influence of Georg Forster. This naturalist accompanied Captain James Cook on his second voyage around the world and published a celebrated travel account in 1777. Although these events were clearly important, Ackerknecht’s list is incomplete. One should also include the Göttingen historians Johann Christoph Gatterer (1727–99), August Ludwig Schlözer (1735–1809), and Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren (1760–1842). These scholars not only discussed ethnographic details in their historical and geographical works but also outlined a study called Völkerkunde or Ethnographie (see chapter 6).
Margaret T. Hodgen’s *Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (1964) entails a great deal of anthropology in chapters like “The Cabinet of Curios,” “Collections of Customs,” “The Ark of Noah and the Problem of Cultural Diversity,” “Diffusion, Degeneration, and Environmentalism,” and “The Problem of Savagery.” Hodgen even studied “the ethnology of the Medieval Encyclopedists” (49–77), but her use of the term “ethnology” is anachronistic. Many studies she discussed were contributions to “cosmography,” a description of the world. An influential example was the *Cosmographia* of the German humanist Sebastian Münster (1544), in which about forty peoples in Europe, Asia, and the New World were described.

James Sydney Slotkin compiled a rich collection of *Readings in Early Anthropology* (1965). Drawing on numerous European sources from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Slotkin cited German authors like Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Herder, Kant, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Blumenbach, and Heeren. Ordered in categories derived from the four-field model, he presented his readings with minimal comments. In a paper presented in Chicago in 1955, published in the same volume, Slotkin (1965:xiii) defined ethnology as “a study of the historical relations between cultures,” concluding that in the period at hand, “There were no students of ethnology as such.” Whereas the first statement is largely correct for the eighteenth century, the second is not, as the present volume demonstrates.

George W. Stocking Jr. published on the history of anthropology in France and Great Britain. He wrote important articles on the Société des Observateurs de l’Homme (1964), the merger of the ethnological and anthropological societies in London (1971), and the ethnological work of James Cowles Prichard (1973). Advancing anthropology’s life span from 1871 back to 1842 (1971) and from 1841 back to 1800 (1964), Stocking was well aware of the terminological differences discussed previously. But he relativized their importance by adopting Shakespeare’s “What’s in a Name?” (1971, 1984b). Whereas Stocking in his early work focused on enlarging the scope of anthropology’s history by looking at the period before Tylor, he later shifted to *Victorian Anthropology* (1987) and the era *After Tylor* (1995). Identifying three “paradigmatic traditions” in anthropology—
the “biblical,” “developmental,” and “polygenetic” (Stocking 1990:713–715, 1992:347–349)—he wrote elsewhere, “A very interesting problem in the history of anthropology [is]: the way in which the Bible functioned as a kind of Kuhnian paradigm for research on the cultural, linguistic and physical diversity of mankind” (Stocking 1982:71).

Robert E. Bieder wrote an indispensable book on early American ethnology (1986). In the dissertation on which it was based, Bieder (1972:18) analyzed American scholarship between 1780 and 1820, distinguishing a “biblical-historical” from a “secular-scientific model.” Could the first of these be the American equivalent of eighteenth-century German ethnology?


Recent Contributions to the Early History of Ethnology

Today most German ethnologists follow Lowie in considering ethnology to commence with nineteenth-century scholars like Klemm, Waitz, and Bastian. Apart from a few authors referring to eighteenth-century scholars like Georg Forster and Herder, the majority of German-speaking ethnologists entertain American, British, and French views of the history of their discipline. They credit Bastian for having laid “the origins of German anthropology” (Fischer et al. 2007). Owing largely to the political isolation of Germany following World Wars I and II, German-speaking ethnologists play a much more modest role in international scholarship after 1945 than they had previously (Gingrich 2005). Adapting in principle to post-war tendencies to view anthropology as the overarching discipline, in practice they do not adhere to the four-field approach. Instead, they continue the continental tradition of pursuing ethnology as a separate study, albeit on a new basis with fieldwork-based research and often under new labels, such as cultural or social anthropology (Haller 2012).
With the reception of Michel Foucault’s *Les mots et les choses* (1966), anthropology and its history became popular topics of research (e.g., Lepenies 1971, 1976; Krauss 1978). However, some scholars continued to pay attention to the history of ethnology. In Paris, Hungarian ethnologist Geza de Rohan-Csermak noted the presence of ethnology and ethnography in the physicist André-Marie Ampère’s classification of sciences of 1829–34. Titling his article “The first appearance of the term *ethnologie*,” de Rohan-Csermak (1967) neglected its previous use by Chavannes. His analysis of Ampère’s 1833–34 work did show that the latter had paid attention to the relations between ethnology, anthropology, and the “social sciences.”

In a book on eighteenth-century anthropology, the Italian historian Sergio Moravia (1970, 1973) discussed Enlightenment scholars, citing documents published by the Société des Observateurs de l’Homme, founded at Paris in 1799. (More on this society in the epilogue.)

The Austrian ethnologist Britta Rupp-Eisenreich, working in Paris, studied early German *Völkerkunde*. She discovered that Meiners’s work had been familiar to two members of this society, Louis-François Jauffret and Joseph-Marie Degérando, who adopted German ethnological ideas from the 1780s and 1790s (Rupp-Eisenreich 1983a, 1983b, 1984, 1985a, 1985b).

The French historian of anthropology Michèle Duchet wrote a celebrated book on *Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières* (1971), focusing on the “anthropological discourse” of Buffon and the philosophers Voltaire, Rousseau, Claude Adrien Helvétius, and Denis Diderot. Anthropology in France has always carried the connotation of being a practice of philosophers, and Duchet’s study pays homage to this tradition. However, Duchet also identified an “ethnological discourse” that she (following Topinard) found in French-speaking Switzerland in the work of Chavannes, who saw *ethnologie* as part of anthropology (12, 229). Remarkably, this is the only reference to ethnology found thus far in the ancien régime.

Claude Blanckaert (1985, 1988, 1989, 1993, 1996) studied the birth of ethnology among missionaries in the Americas from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the origins of French ethnology with Edwards, and the history of anthropology in France. He was able to trace only one occurrence of the term “ethnography” in France.

As ethnology, in the words of Stocking (1971:372), “was still new to English usage” when Richard King issued a prospectus to found an ethnological society in London in 1842, this leads to a surprising question: Had ethnology developed earlier within the Russian Empire and the Holy Roman Empire than in France (from 1820 on) and Great Britain (from 1842 on)?

In 1970 Hans Fischer, from the University of Hamburg, pointed out that the concepts *ethnographia* and *Völkerkunde* had surfaced as early as 1775 in Gatterer’s *Abriß der Geographie* (Overview of geography), published at Göttingen. Both concepts served as equivalents and were classified together with *anthropologia* or *Menschenkunde* as a category within geography. Fischer evaluated all previous claims concerning the origins of the concepts *Völkerkunde*, ethnography, and ethnology. He found that the term *Völkerkunde* appeared in the titles of “a great number of books and journals during the 1780s and 1790s that have two things in common: they all derive from northern Germany, especially from Göttingen and either relate to geographical textbooks or to travel accounts” (H. Fischer 1970:170). Fischer thought, incorrectly as we now know, that Gatterer was also the first to use *Ethnographie*, but he did notice that this term served as a synonym of *Völkerkunde*. He concluded, “*Völkerkunde* and *Ethnographie* originated simultaneously and with the same meaning—as translations of each other—in northern Germany and in all likelihood in Göttingen” (176, 181). As these terms later occur in the work of geographers in Göttingen and Hamburg, “there can be little doubt that *Völkerkunde* originated here as part of geography” (182).

As to *Ethnologie*, Fischer pointed not only at the Swiss theologian Chavannes (1787) but also at the French physicist Ampère (1833, 1834) and the French archaeologist Edme-François Jomard (1839). On the basis of these references and his own findings concerning the early emergence of *Ethnographie* in northern Germany, Fischer concluded that *Ethnologie* “certainly originated in the French-speaking world, perhaps in imitation of *Ethnographie*, possibly several times independently of each other” (H. Fischer 1970:182). Noting that *Ethnologie* initially meant more or less the same as *Ethnographie*, he observed
the shift in meaning during the 1830s and 1840s, when ethnology was defined as a study of races.

Fischer expanded the state of our knowledge, but the dates he provided are no longer correct. Gatterer could not have coined the concepts *Völkerkunde* and *Ethnographie* because his colleague Schlözer had used them four years earlier and more often. In addition, Chavannes had not been the first to use the term “ethnology.” The Slovak historian Ján Tibenský reported in 1978 that *ethnologia* was defined by historian-cum-librarian Adam František Kollár in a book written in Latin and published in Vienna in 1783: “Ethnology . . . is the study of peoples and nations” (*ethnologia . . . est notitia gentium populorumque*). Given the effects of the Cold War on scholarly exchange, this definition remained unknown to the West until colleagues from Slovenia drew attention to it during a 1992 conference in Prague (Vermeulen 1995).

Justin Stagl, working at the universities in Bonn and Salzburg, improved on Fischer’s findings. He discovered in 1974 that Schlözer had used the terms *Völkerkunde* and *Ethnographie*, along with *ethnographisch*, three years before Gatterer in a textbook on universal history, *Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie* (1772, 1775). In it Schlözer outlined “an ethnographic method” of history, that is, a history according to peoples. While Gatterer used these terms only once, Schlözer did so several times and, according to Stagl (1974a:79, 1981:20 n. 16), “for the first time.” Both Gatterer and Schlözer used the terms as synonyms. Stagl had been led to Schlözer’s *Vorstellung* through Herder, who in a review had attacked Schlözer’s theory of world history and criticized his use of the term *ethnographisch*, which sounded “harsh” to him (Herder 1772). Schlözer had reacted to Herder by means of a second part of his world history (Schlözer 1773b), in which he defended his views and his usage of *ethnographisch*. Stagl saw in Schlözer’s *Vorstellung* an “outline of a *Völkerkunde* or *Ethnographie*” and confirmed that Göttingen was the location where *Völkerkunde* had originated. He did not assert that Schlözer had invented these concepts but inferred that Schlözer, in his reply to Herder, had implicitly claimed the word *ethnographisch* as his intellectual property. Like Fischer, Stagl did not exclude the possibility that the concepts had been coined several times and “perhaps even before Schlözer” (Stagl 1974a:74, 81).
My own research built on Fischer’s and Stagl’s findings as well as on primary materials made available by members of the Eduard Winter School in East Germany. During studies in Leiden, I discovered that the terms *Völkerkunde*, *Ethnographie*, and *ethnographisch*, together with *Ethnograph*, had appeared in Schlözer’s *Allgemeine Nordische Geschichte* (General history of the North), published in Halle in 1771, a book Fischer and Stagl had overlooked. Much more elaborate than Schlözer’s *Vorstellung*, this volume presented a history of the European and Asian North, which Schlözer considered to be interconnected. In line with the historical linguistics introduced by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (see chapter 2), Schlözer used these terms to study the peoples of the world and arrange them in a *Systema populorum* or *Völker-System*. He used the terms in strategic places in his argument and much more often than Gatterer or any other contemporary author. This made it likely that he had coined them in or before 1770–71 while writing his *Allgemeine Nordische Geschichte*. This hypothesis, in turn, would confirm Fischer’s and Stagl’s view that *Völkerkunde* originated in Göttingen (Vermeulen 1988, 1992).

Subsequent research in German libraries, especially in Göttingen, provided sufficient evidence for concluding that the early history of *Völkerkunde* or *Ethnographie* was indeed a stage in the history of ethnology rather than its prehistory (as Bastian had surmised). In 1994 I had the opportunity to publish a list of forty-two books and journals printed in Germany, Bohemia, and Switzerland between 1771 and 1791 having one of the terms *Völkerkunde*, *Ethnographie*, *Volkskunde*, or *Ethnologie* in either their titles or the text (Vermeulen 1994a:340–342). I formulated the theory that this early stage, which could be called “the conceptualization of ethnology or *Völkerkunde* [as a] descriptive and historical study of all nations,” had been followed by the institutionalization of ethnology and ethnography during the nineteenth century. In the latter stage, “ethnology underwent a transformation and was influenced by nationalistic ideas on the one hand (especially in Central and Eastern Europe) and by racial ideas on the other (particularly in France and England)” (Vermeulen 1994b, 1995:40, 54).

This theory, published in Moscow and London, was put to the test by later findings. In 1994 Klaus Schmidt, head of the Zeitschriften-
Index in Göttingen, discovered that Schlözer had not been the first to use the term *Ethnographie*: historian Johann Friedrich Schöpperlin, working in Nördlingen, Swabia, had done so four years earlier, in 1767. I reported on Schmidt’s findings in several articles. They were surprising as Schöpperlin’s name had never been mentioned in the secondary literature that focused on the University of Göttingen or on Schlözer’s and Gatterer’s work at that university. However, as we shall see in chapter 6, there was a direct relation among Schöpperlin, Schlözer, and Müller.

Stagl included some of these findings in a chapter on “August Ludwig Schlözer and the Study of Mankind According to Peoples” (Stagl 1995a, 2002a). Stagl’s books *A History of Curiosity: The Theory of Travel, 1550–1800* (1995) and *Eine Geschichte der Neugier* (2002) focus on the “art of traveling” (*ars apodemica*) and instructions for travelers, beginning in the sixteenth century. He identified three research methods used before the professionalization of anthropology and sociology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: travel, questionnaires, and the acquisition of objects. Schlözer’s ethnographic approach to world history occupied a central place in Stagl’s argument. In an article on “the controversy between Schlözer and Herder,” Stagl concluded that what he called the “ethnos-terms” (*Ethnographie, Völkerkunde, ethnologie*, and *Volkskunde*), which “stress human cultural diversity over the fundamental unity of mankind,” were “coined by a group of mutually known scholars in late eighteenth-century Germany,” that is, within the context of the German Enlightenment (Stagl 1998).

A conference about naturalist-explorer Georg Wilhelm Steller held at Halle (Saale) in 1996 indicated that the work of the Göttingen historians had been built on a foundation laid during the first half of the eighteenth century. Ethnology had been prepared by historian Gerhard Friedrich Müller and other members of the Second Kamchatka, or Second Bering, Expedition (1733–43) during research in Russian Asia. Müller conducted ethnographic fieldwork; instructed other expedition members, like Steller, to carry out ethnographic research; wrote extensive instructions to that effect; and in summary used the term *Völker-Beschreibung* (ethnography) in one of those instructions, dated 1740 (see chapter 4). The Halle conference was convened by Wieland Hintzsche, an expert on the Kamchatka expeditions. Together with Aleksandr Elert, a Russian historian of...
Müller’s work, Hintzsche has recently published Müller’s manuscripts from the 1730s and 1740s (Müller 2009, 2010d). These texts, partly written in Siberia, confirm that there had been a stage, before the introduction of *Völkerkunde* and *ethnologia* in the academic centers of Göttingen and Vienna, during which a new research program for describing all peoples of Siberia had been conceived and developed: *Völker-Beschreibung*. This was the first step toward the conceptualization of ethnology as the study of the world’s peoples.

While the earlier studies were conducted in an absolutist and imperial setting by historians or physicians like Müller and Steller during the Early Enlightenment, emanating from central Germany, the later ones were carried out by historians Schlözer, Gatterer, and Kollár in northern Germany and Austria during the Late Enlightenment, with no direct connection to colonialism. I made this point in several articles, the first of which (Vermeulen 1999) was cited by Stagl (2002a) and Werner Petermann (2004). Although both scholars adopted some of my data and interpretations, I now feel that ethnology cannot be properly understood without looking more closely at the genesis of ethnography before 1767. This is one of the reasons for writing the present book. Hopefully, a history of the German ethnographic tradition, characterized by a comprehensive, empirical, and comparative perspective, may inspire scholars in the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and other countries to reexamine the early material and conduct historical research on eighteenth-century studies of peoples and nations.

**Anthropology and Colonialism**

Ethnography as a description of peoples emerged from the field in the context of the Russian exploration of Siberia and Alaska. As the Siberian conquest had begun in 1581, the Kamchatka expeditions were part of Russian expansion and the postconquest colonization of Siberia (Dahlmann 2009; Donnert 2009). The relation between ethnography and empire may thus be seen as evidence of the theory that anthropology evolved from colonialism, was in league with it, and derived some of its key notions from it (e.g., Asad 1973, 1991; Pels 2008). However, in anthropology and its historiography, this theory is a matter of controversy (H. S. Lewis 2014).

The debate started with the questioning of authority in the 1960s.
Charges were made that anthropology was a form of “scientific colonialism” (Galtung 1967) and the “child of imperialism” (Gough 1968a, 1968b). Others accused anthropology of complicity with contemporary imperialism (Stauder 1972; D. Lewis 1973). In 1969 Dell Hymes published a volume on “reinventing anthropology” in which critical anthropologists called for a reflexive approach to ethnography, critical awareness, and ethical concern (Hymes 1969, 1972). Taking a stand against historical studies fueled by political debates, Raymond Firth argued that “anthropology is not the bastard of colonialism but the legitimate offspring of the Enlightenment” (Firth 1972:26; 1975:44). Following Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard, Firth pointed at the eighteenth-century roots of social anthropology, thus distancing the discipline from its ties with colonialism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In 1972 Ian Cunnison initiated a seminar in Hull, resulting in the volume *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, edited by Talal Asad (1973). Presenting relatively benign conclusions on the nexus between anthropology and colonial rule, mainly in India and Africa, Asad’s volume inspired a seminar at the London School of Economics (lse) that attacked the basic premises of the Hull sessions. Peter Loizos, editor of the lse volume, found the argument that anthropology was a handmaiden of colonialism “acrimonious” and pleaded for more nuance (Loizos 1977).

In the following years the history of anthropology profited from a renewed interest in anthropology’s past and present links to academia and society at large. Anthropology’s agenda reflected these developments: the study of ethics and of complex societies, “fieldwork at home,” and applied anthropology all came to the center of attention (H. S. Lewis 1998, 2009). The notions that reality is “socially constructed” (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and that cultural traditions are (continuously) being “invented” (Hobsbawm 1983) were particularly fruitful. This, in turn, led to an inversion of the relationship between the observer and the observed as well as to an increased self-consciousness within the field of ethnography. Whereas in earlier histories of anthropology (Haddon 1910; Penniman 1935; Mühlmann 1948) attention had been paid primarily to a genealogical history of ideas about “other,” non-Western people, the interest now focused on the observer instead of on the observed. Another powerful influ-
ence on this change in focus (or “gaze”) was the critical work of the literary scholar Edward Said (1978), who claimed that “Orientalism” was the intellectual counterpart of colonialism, a way of representing “other” people, particularly in the Middle East, leading to cultural appropriation.

From a historical perspective, the relation between anthropology and colonialism has been so close that it only became possible to speak of the history of anthropology in colonial contexts (plural) during the 1990s. In Colonial Situations Stocking (1991:5) stressed the necessity of pluralizing the “colonial situation” in order to “explore in greater depth a variety of differing ‘colonial situations,’ the range of interaction of widely differing individuals and groups within them and the ways in which these situational interactions conditioned the specific ethnographic knowledge that emerged.” Surprisingly, perhaps, studies of such a complicated subject are sparse. We find some chapters in books (Kuper 1973; Kuklick 1991; Goody 1995; Stocking 1995), a few monographs (Leclerc 1972; H. Fischer 1981; Gotsch 1983; N. Thomas 1991, 1994), several edited volumes (Asad 1973; Copans 1975; Loizos 1977; Diamond 1980; Stocking 1991; Dirks 1992; Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993; Cooper and Stoler 1997; van Bremen and Shimizu 1999), and a volume in two versions edited by Pels and Salemink (1994, 1999). The latter discuss ethnography in colonial “practices” during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their view is presentist, rather than historicist, and their cases often include traders, government officials, soldiers, and amateur ethnographers rather than professional anthropologists (for a critique, see H. S. Lewis 2004, 2014).

In postcolonial studies literary specialists search for models of inclusion and exclusion during colonialism, testing Foucault’s theory that knowledge and power are intrinsically linked. Again, most cases are drawn from nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonialism, although Zantop (1997) and Berman (1998) deal with precolonial discourse in German society. (Germany’s overseas colonial period lasted from 1884 to 1918.) The Canadian literary scholar, Mary Louise Pratt, argued in Imperial Eyes (1992) that eighteenth-century travel accounts were attempts to intellectually annex non-European territory and pave the way for colonial expansion. This interpretation makes the endeavor sound intentional, as if travelers were consciously pro-
moting the “Western project” of colonization. However, the Dutch literary scholar Siegfried Huigen, after having analyzed accounts of ten eighteenth-century travelers to the Cape Colony, concluded that most of them were not concerned with profit but with questions posed by the scientific literature of their era: “Many travellers [discussed in his book] do not satisfy the image currently prevailing in the postcolonial theory, namely that of the narrow-minded European who already knew before his departure what was wrong with the natives. On the whole, the travellers of the eighteenth century took pains to understand foreign cultures, were inquisitive and had the latest knowledge at their disposal” (Huigen 2007:35, 2009:30). This raises the question: Were these travelers “agents of modernity” and pioneers of Western expansion or were they ambitious scientists driven by curiosity and a scholarly agenda?

The answer to this question depends on both the colonial context in which the scholars traveled and their scientific goals. Eighteenth-century visitors to South Africa like Peter Kolb were not part of the Dutch colonial project in the Cape Colony. Carsten Niebuhr was not a subject of the Ottoman Empire, through which the Danish-German Arabia Expedition passed during the 1760s (see chapter 5). In both cases the travelers carried out scholarly programs. German scholars working for Russian imperial rulers in northern Asia were dispatched by the Academy of Science as members of scientific expeditions. They held no position in the Russian colonial administration. Scholars like Daniel Gottlieb Messerschmidt, Müller, and Steller had been commissioned to report on natural resources, but they collected and recorded many things that bore no relationship to economic gains. Certainly, the authorities in St. Petersburg saw the peoples inhabiting their empire as a source of taxes and furs, a resource to be tapped. This utilitarian goal led the Russian officials to express an interest in a description of the peoples in their expanding empire. Apparently, Messerschmidt, Müller, Steller, and many others were prepared to produce such descriptions according to their scholarly standards.

The genesis of ethnography in Siberia was the result of several factors, including state interests (power, taxes, legal order) and scholarly curiosity (Stagl 2002b). Following a colonial agenda, the Russian authorities required an inventory of the peoples under their rule. In
In this context, Tsar Peter’s pragmatic interest in science and technology is significant. The alliance between science and imperial policy gave birth to an academic study. Müller and his colleagues operated in a colonial context but their scientific agenda, as will be explained in chapters 2 to 4, was based on the following: (1) the ethnolinguistic program suggested by Leibniz, tested by Messerschmidt, and carried out by Müller, Fischer, and Schlözer; (2) the comparative program of Lafitau that Müller adopted; and (3) the Early Enlightenment’s emphasis on empirical research, building on Francis Bacon and the philosophy of the Scientific Revolution. The combination of these factors, paired with Siberia’s diversity and the German ethnological perspective—the product of the scholars having been raised in multilingual, multiethnic, and multireligious parts of Europe—resulted in the birth of ethnography as a new scientific field in Russia during the second quarter of the eighteenth century.

In an afterword to Stocking’s volume *Colonial Situations*, Asad observed,

> The role of anthropologists in maintaining structures of imperial domination has, despite slogans to the contrary, usually been trivial; the knowledge they produced was often too esoteric for government use and even where it was usable it was marginal in comparison to the vast body of information routinely accumulated by merchants, missionaries and administrators. But if the role of anthropology for colonialism was relatively unimportant, the reverse proposition does not hold. The process of European global power has been central to the anthropological task of recording and analysing the ways of life of subject populations, even when a serious consideration of that power was theoretically excluded. (Asad 1991:315)

As will become clear, Asad’s first point, that anthropology’s role with regard to colonialism was “relatively unimportant,” cannot be confirmed by the case of the eighteenth-century Russian expeditions. The use of ethnographic information by the colonial administration in Siberia, the Urals, and the Volga basin during the eighteenth century has not been investigated. Asad’s second point, that the “process of European global power has been central to the anthropological task of recording and analysing,” seems accurate, provided we consider the early eighteenth-century Russian Empire and its Asian
possessions as belonging to Europe and “anthropology” as taken to mean the description of peoples referred to as *ethnographia* soon afterward (1767–75).

Thus, to the extent that ethnography was invented by German scholars in eighteenth-century Russia, anthropology profited from the Russian exploration of Siberia. However, the other side of the debate on anthropology and colonialism—if and to what extent ethnography contributed to the Russian Empire—remains unanswered. My thesis is that anthropology was not born of colonialism (as Gough and others assert on the basis of nineteenth- and twentieth-century evidence) but developed within its context (Vermeulen 1999). If anthropology has had a symbiotic relation with colonialism, it did not evolve from it. Rather, anthropology was drawn into and advanced within these contexts; the inspiration came from other sectors of society, notably the development and diffusion of a scientific (ethnological) outlook on the world. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between “colonial anthropology” and “anthropology developed in colonial contexts.” (More on this in chapters 4 and 5 and the conclusion.)

**Ethnicity and Race**

Most German ethnologists are unaware of the originality of their ethnographic tradition, which formulated the basic distinction between ethnography and ethnology, outlined the world’s national diversity (*Völkervielfalt*) as their subject matter, and coined the concepts with which these studies are designated even today, more than two centuries later. Moreover, this ethnographic tradition, and the ethnological program at its basis, focusing on a descriptive and comparative study of “peoples” and “nations,” differed significantly from the anthropological tradition developed by naturalists like Linnaeus and Buffon, philosophers like Kant, and anatomists like Blumenbach dealing with human “varieties” or “races.” The distinction between these fields is comparable to that between civil (or political) history (*historia civilis*) and natural history (*historia naturalis*), the division of labor between the historian Müller and the naturalist Johann Georg Gmelin during the Second Kamchatka Expedition (see chapter 4). Thus ethnology and anthropology belonged to distinct scientific domains, and scholars pursuing either of these
subjects had been trained in different faculties, of arts and medicine, respectively.

The question is, of course, what the difference was between “peoples” and “races.” This issue is relevant for two reasons. First, the confusion among scholars about these subjects and their deliberate blending by dictatorial regimes have led to horrible genocides in the past. Second, this confusion to a certain extent continues to the present day. In the United States today, Hispanics, defined by language, are regarded as an ethnic group. The latter category also includes Afro-Americans, defined by skin color, which is usually seen as a marker of race. Thus, the concepts of race and ethnicity are often confounded. Their equation not only occurs in the United States but also in the United Kingdom: “Race is generally classified in U.K. policy documents as equivalent to ethnicity” (Evans 2010:119).

The history of the distinction between ethnicity and race, nations and ethnic groups, is highly complicated. Eighteenth-century views on nations or peoples differed from current usage. Ever since the invention of the nation-state, nations are primarily seen as political entities, characterized by a constitution and often a state. This view reflects political developments of the past two centuries, in the course of which the nation, serving as the modern word for “a people” (Lat. *gens*), came to be defined as a political entity, usually and increasingly so, for a nation-state (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; A. D. Smith 1986; Hobsbawm 1990; Hroch 1996). In the eighteenth century, however, when scholars like Leibniz began to investigate languages in order to study the origins and migrations of peoples, they referred to the latter as “nations” (Lat. *gentes*). For Leibniz and German-speaking historians, nations were groups of people connected by means of a common history and usually a shared territory and predominantly defined by their languages. In the same tradition, the Dutch lexicographer Pieter Weiland defined ethnography in 1824 as “a study of morals.”

While Leibniz was not familiar with the concept of culture, which surfaced among German historians during the 1770s (Carhart 2007), his view on nations built on legal theories about “natural law” (*jus naturae*) and the “law of nations” (*jus gentium*). A central problem for German legal scholars and historians was that in spite of the political and religious diversity within the Holy Roman Empire, there was
a great deal of linguistic unity. This union of about three hundred states and territories in central Europe (962–1806), nominally ruled by the Habsburg emperor, was the only empire to be found in continental Europe, apart from the Ottoman Empire. In the world at large, there were many sorts of nations, depending on whether they had their own state, were part of a larger state or empire, and so on. Kollár included both gens and populus in his 1783 definition of ethnology, which reflected time-honored distinctions between homogeneous and heterogeneous nations. The Latin concepts gens, populus, and natio derive from Greek and Roman texts reintroduced by the humanists. For the Greeks a people (mostly ethnos) was primarily defined by its origins and descent, including cultural traditions. The Latin term populus, on the contrary, referred to a heterogeneous unit, consisting of several gentes or nations. It was this diversity that was to be the primary object of ethnological studies, as Leibniz, Müller, Schlözer, and Kollár make clear: How are these peoples related? What are their origins? Whence do they derive? What groups do their names (often invented by others) indicate? Should they be distinguished, or do they belong together?

The concept of race entered German scholarship during the 1760s, when Kant introduced the word Racen, borrowed from Buffon. To Kant, racial traits are immutable and inheritable. He saw races as deviations that were constantly preserved over generations (see chapter 7). Kant is regarded as the founder of the modern concept of race (Scheidt 1923–24, 1950; Mühlmann 1968:57–58; Bernasconi 2001b, 2002). Mühlmann saw Kant as “the founder of the modern concept of race” and Blumenbach as “the real father of human racial studies (Rassenkunde).” Kant’s and Blumenbach’s racial theories related to the biological variation in the human species, not to the study of ethnic diversity. The differences can be summed up by equating race with skin color and nation with language. A key part of the problem was that sciences had to be coined by means of a terminology based on Greek. A term for race was not included in classical Greek vocabulary. Therefore, the study of race had no scientific name.

Although nations (the object of eighteenth-century ethnology) are not the same as races (the object of physical anthropology until 1945), their studies were often confounded. For example, when the German geographer Oscar Peschel’s Völkerkunde (1874) was trans-
lated into English, its title became *The Races of Man and Their Geographical Distribution* (1876). When the French anthropologist Joseph Deniker published a handbook titled *Les races et les peuples de la terre: éléments d’anthropologie et d’ethnographie* (1900), it was immediately translated into English but published under the significantly shortened title *The Races of Man: An Outline of Anthropology and Ethnography* (1900).

Deniker coined the term *groupe ethnique*, seeing ethnic groups as “constituted by the different combinations of the ‘Somatological Units’ or ‘Races’” (Deniker 1900b:1–11). Elucidating this term during a lecture at the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland in 1904, Deniker noted that the concept of race was too confusing; therefore, a term should be introduced to include the various races. Julian S. Huxley and Alfred C. Haddon adopted this term in their work *We Europeans* (1935). However, while Deniker saw “ethnic group” as a higher-level term, including races, Huxley and Haddon utilized it as another word for “people.” They spoke of “ethnic classification,” “ethnic groups of Europe,” and the “ethnic composition of European nations” (Huxley and Haddon 1935:110, 144–163, 164–187, 188–240).

After World War II the UNESCO Committee on Race proposed to replace the term “races” with “ethnic groups.” Ashley Montagu, one of the committee members, summarized one of the committee’s recommendations of 1950 as follows:

> National, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups; and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated genetic connexion with racial traits. Because serious errors of this kind are habitually committed when the term “race” is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term “race” altogether and speak of ethnic groups. (Ashley Montagu 1952:99)

Although well intended, this decision has increased the confusion that began when Edwards and his associates, and their predecessors, conflated races and nations in France and Britain (Conze 1984:156–157). Even if scholarly opposition to the biological view of “ethnic groups” increased during the 1970s, when ethnicity in a sociological sense was introduced, the physical view on ethnicity seems...
to be dominant in state policies and among the general public (see also Banton 2002, 2010). If language is a valid criterion for distinguishing between peoples or nations, then the number of languages should equal the number of peoples. The eighteenth-century linguists Fritz and Schulzze (1748) listed 200 languages and dialects. Repeating this number, Schrözer (1771a) specified “at least 200.” Adelung and Vater (1806–17) augmented it to “almost 500.” Balbi (1826a) classified 700 languages. At present 7,106 living languages are known in the world, 915 of which are listed as endangered (P. Lewis 2014). By contrast, Linnaeus (1735) identified just four human “varieties” (or races), primarily on the basis of skin color and obviously linked to the four continents then known. Today, most biological anthropologists no longer regard “race” as a valid scientific category. But these variations in numbers indicate that there was and is an enormous difference between “ethnic groups” (or nations) and human “races.”

In the following, the shift from a linguistic-ethnological to a biological-anthropological definition of ethnic groups can only be signaled. To explain it would require another book. But to notice such a shift at all, we need a proper perspective and a solid methodology.

What’s In a Name? Methodology in the History of Science

In the historiography of anthropology, the discipline’s past is often viewed in terms of present-day models. Stocking (1981:19) called anthropology “the hybrid study of human culture and nature,” defined as a “discipline uniting at least two distinct scholarly traditions: the natural historical and the social theoretical (with input as well from various lines of humanistic inquiry).” Likewise, Eric Wolf once characterized anthropology as “the most scientific of the humanities and the most humanistic of the social sciences.” Thus the concept of anthropology as developed in North America is of a composite nature: half humanities, half science.

This ambiguity causes complications when pursuing the history of anthropology. To give just one example, Douglas Cole, in his biography of Franz Boas, cited him reflecting on his formative years at the Berlin museum. The museum’s director, Bastian, was assisted by four aides, each with a regional specialty. Boas wrote that “it was my good fortune . . . to work in the inspiring surroundings of the Royal
Ethnographical Museum of Berlin” and “in close friendship” with these colleagues. Cole (1999:96) added that the men were roughly the same age and, “though from diverse backgrounds and specialties, were also trying to make sense of the new science of anthropology.” This assessment is a historical misjudgment for two reasons: first, the science of anthropology was not “new,” and second, there was not “one” science of anthropology but at least two. In Berlin Boas worked on ethnology, under Bastian, as well as on physical anthropology, under Rudolf Virchow. Glossing over the differences, Cole arrived at an anachronistic statement concerning Boas working on anthropology in the Berlin museum, although he was, in fact, there working on ethnology.

The history of anthropology, according to Stocking, can best be studied by adopting a historicist approach. His distinction between historicist and presentist approaches (Stocking 1965b, 1999; see also Di Brizio 1995) is invaluable. Historicism is an attempt to describe the past in its own terms and study past events and ideas in their contemporary context. Presentism is a mode of historical analysis in which present-day views are anachronistically inserted into representations of the past and past complexities obscured. This is usually done to construct a lineage of relevance. The latter approach is also known as “Whig history,” after eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English historians who represented the past to validate their political beliefs (Butterfield 1931, 1955, 1969). Stocking coined the term “presentism” in analogy of “ethnocentrism” (a term introduced by Sumner in 1906). Examples of a presentist approach, in which current views of anthropology are transported into the past, include Daniel Carey’s (2004) analysis of John Locke’s “anthropology” and John Gascoigne’s (1994) presenting the botanist Joseph Banks as an “anthropologist.” The reverse position, seeing ethnology as emerging earlier than it actually did, is exemplified not only by Hodgen (1964), but also by Joan-Pau Rubiés (2000, 2007), who studies Renaissance travelers and cosmographers as contributing to a “history of early modern travel and ethnology.” Rubiés’s assumption that their accounts were similar to ethnology is anachronistic because this subject did not exist before the eighteenth century.

These examples indicate that the history of anthropology is an anthropological problem, as A. Irving Hallowell (1965) articulated
fifty years ago. A historicist approach may prevent anachronisms, errors with regard to the chronological sequence, but it does not suffice (Darnell 2001). The historiography of anthropology can profit from the distinction between “emic” and “etic” analyses of behavior that Kenneth Pike introduced into linguistics in 1966–67 and Ward Goodenough into cultural anthropology in 1970. Emic is an account of human behavior in terms meaningful to the actor; etic an account in terms familiar to the observer. Marvin Harris in The Rise of Anthropological Theory (1968) analyses “theories of cultures” from the past in order to promote a theory in the present. By means of a scientific, behaviorally-based, “etic” approach to the understanding of culture, Harris (1976) set out his personal theory of cultural materialism, evaluating past theories from this perspective and eliminating much that was important to past scholars themselves. Such reductions can be avoided only by combining a historical-critical approach with an emic perspective. Therefore, anthropology’s history should be studied by describing developments from within and by historicizing as fully as possible.

The primary method applied by most authors dealing with the origins of ethnology and ethnography, as we have seen, is conceptual history. In his preface to a journal on conceptual history, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, founded in 1955, Erich Rothacker drew attention to the “many-layered interrelatedness of the history of problems and the history of terminology” (Bödeker 1998, 2002a; Boer 1998). I propose to focus on the conceptualization of ethnography and ethnology during the eighteenth century and relate that to changes in object and methods. If we regard the dates and meanings of ethnography, ethnology, and anthropology as indicators of more general developments, the method has great potential. It points to shifts in meaning and terminological innovations, allowing us to observe shifts otherwise overlooked. Stagl (1995a:234, 1998:521) found the concepts that are the focus of the present book so important that he coined a name for them: ethnos-terms. Each time one of these terms is encountered, it must be analyzed and contextualized. In my view, the coining of the terms Völker-Beschreibung (1740), ethnographia (1767–75), Völkerkunde (1771–81), and ethnologia (1781–83) indicates the emergence of a separate science of peoples during the eighteenth century. Contemporary scholars saw these terms as referring to a new scientific study.
However, several theoretical views were advanced, from diverging research traditions, during the eighteenth century. For historiographical purposes it is essential to study these traditions in their historical, political, and academic contexts.

Furthermore, it is vital to look for changes in meaning and scope as these are often related to shifts in theory and method. Because of such ruptures, I concentrate on changes in terminology and practice that suggest “hidden” paradigmatic shifts. A paradigm, according to Thomas S. Kuhn (1962, 1977), “is what the members of a scientific community, and they alone, share” (Kuhn 1974:460). While this concept is of great value to the historiography of the natural sciences (Golinski 1998; Renn 2012), it is less suitable with regard to the humanities, characterized by a larger degree of individuality among scholars. I therefore prefer Imre Lakatos’s (1977) definition of paradigms as “research programs.” Thus the coining of the concept "Völker-Beschreibung" (1740) implied the formulation of an ethnological research program, stipulating the object of study and the methods for attaining it. The introduction of the ethnos-terms (1740–87) implied a paradigmatic shift from the study of “manners and customs” (Sitten und Gebräuche) toward the study of peoples or nations and their morals. (The German term Sitten can be translated both as “manners” and as “morals.”) Another example is the shift from a “science of nations” toward a “science of human races” during the 1830s and 1840s, which foreshadowed the demise of the ethnological societies during the 1850s and their absorption in anthropological institutions during the 1870s and 1880s.

Needless to say, conceptual history has its limitations. Sometimes sciences are formulated without a name. Vico’s Scienza Nuova (1725) is a classic example. Therefore, conceptual history must be complemented by an analysis of definitions and programmatic statements in the texts, the history of the reception of scientific innovations, and the study of scholarly practice. In an effort to locate eighteenth-century debates among German-speaking scholars in their context and link them to their immediate forebears, the humanists and empiricists, I consistently strive to apply the historicist-emic-paradigmatic approach.

Ideally, such a study should be pursued within a comparative framework. International connections in scholarship need to be taken
into account. There is no single national standpoint from which the history of anthropology can be studied. Moreover, we have to bear in mind that it is virtually impossible to completely transcend one’s cultural categories, as ethnographic studies abundantly demonstrate. In dealing with foreign cultures or other time frames we are always led by the images, views, and emotions acquired from educators, books, and media. A truly historicist study is untenable and our historical interpretations will always be influenced by presentist concerns (Kuper 1991; Urry 1996; Darnell 2001). The ideal of grasping another reality by means of its own emic categories can be accomplished only to a certain extent. Moreover, a researcher must always return to the theoretical (etic) language in which he or she needs to report about what was found in social practice (Banton 2011, 2013). Therefore, as the historian of anthropology Jacob W. Gruber (1982:590) reminded us, in the history of science, “as in anthropology itself, some double vision is required in which one can see the now and then, the here and there.”

Pursuing the historiography with the four-field model in mind, one would be led to assume that ethnology developed as a sub-field of anthropology. Instead, as the present study demonstrates, ethnology and anthropology developed along parallel tracks, with their participants working in diverging domains of science. The four-field model would be misleading for a historical analysis of developments before the model was introduced. More suitable for describing eighteenth-century developments seems to be the model of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (iuaes). Founded in 1948, the union opted for a horizontal ordering of anthropological and ethnological sciences (in the plural).

The aims of the present project are, first, to retrace, describe, and contextualize the early history of ethnography and ethnology in German-speaking territories in the Age of Reason; second, to connect that body of scholarship to developments in other parts of the world during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and third, to study the contemporary distinction between anthropology and ethnology while recording when these studies were connected.

The following chapters are devoted to the conceptualization and early institutionalization of ethnography and ethnology. Chapter
2 deals with Leibniz's theories about the importance of historical language studies for elucidating the early history of peoples. It also shows the relations Leibniz entertained with Peter the Great and his advisers from 1697 to Leibniz's death in 1716. Chapter 3 discusses the postconquest exploration of Russian Asia by Russian, Swedish, Dutch, and German scholars, including the pioneering Siberia expedition by Messerschmidt (1719–27). Chapter 4 deals with later Russian-German explorations of Siberia, particularly the Second Kamchatka Expedition (1733–43). As a participant in this expedition, the historian Müller developed a program of ethnographic research titled *Völker-Beschreibung* of Siberia (spb aras, Müller, n.d. [1740]) and wrote a recently published comparative “Description of Siberian peoples” (Müller 2010c). Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the Danish-German Arabia Expedition (1761–67), which gathered ethnographic data on the Middle East but did not produce an ethnographic research program. Chapter 6 is devoted to the formation of *Völkerkunde* in universities and academies during the second half of the eighteenth century. It analyzes the introduction of the concepts *ethnographia* and *ethnologia*, *Völkerkunde* and *Volkskunde* by Schlözer, Gatterer, Kollár, and other scholars in northern Germany and central Europe during the 1770s and 1780s, in the context of historical, geographical, and linguistic discussions on the origins and migrations of peoples and nations. It also deals with the program of a global *Völkerkunde* and Herder's efforts to transform this into a relativist study of the world's peoples. Chapter 7 sketches the parallel development of eighteenth-century German anthropology as the medical, theological, physical, and philosophical study of humankind. In the epilogue, the influence of the German ethnographic tradition on scholars in France, Russia, the Netherlands, the United States, and Great Britain is outlined.